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Electronic brokerages on the Internet represent one of the most successful examples of 
electronic commerce, having captured over 20% of retail stock trades. According to 
economic theory, prices of commodities like securities should converge to one price in a 
market with the transparency of the Internet. A review of published commissions for 
online brokers shows that this "law of one price" does not appear to hold for the 
commissions charged by retail brokers. In this paper we explore one possible explanation 
for these differences in commissions. Specifically, we test whether the total cost of 
trading, including commissions and savings based on the quality of execution, obeys the 
law of one price. In a carefully designed experiment, we simultaneously purchased or 
sold 100 share lots of stock using a voice-broker, an expensive online broker and an 
inexpensive online broker in each trial. We found relatively few price improvements, 
which are a measure of execution quality. The difference among brokers in obtaining 
price improvements was not statistically significant. The brokers do exhibit statistically 
significant differences in total trading costs; at a volume of 100 shares commission costs 
dominate execution quality. We explore the implications of the findings for larger lot 
sizes, choosing a broker, and electronic commerce in the brokerage industry. 
The authors wish to thank Professor Ingo Waiter and the Salomon Brothers Center at the Stern School for 
their support and willingness to underwrite the research reported in this paper. 
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Electronic commerce has the potential to revolutionize the way in which we 
acquire goods and services. One of the greatest successes in e-commerce has been 
Internet stock trading; it is estimated that nearly 20% of retail stock trades took place on- 
line at the end of 1998, and that on-line trades will grow to 49% by the end of 2000 
(Business Week, 11/15/99). (Retail stock trades are those involving individual investors 
as opposed to trades conducted by financial institutions like mutual funds.) As of 
November 1999, Gomez Advisors lists 50 electronic brokers, including firms dedicated 
to online trading and full-service brokerage firms offering Internet trading directly or 
through a subsidiary (www.gomez.com). 
The Internet facilitates price comparisons among different sellers (Bakos, 1997), 
and economic theory suggests that markets with low search costs and commodity 
products will move to a "Bertrand equilibrium in which all sellers offer products at the 
same price (the "law of one price"). Shares of a certain type of stock are identical 
products regardless of the broker involved in buying or selling them. One would expect 
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that retail investors are aware of the availability of low commissions from electronic 
stock brokers, and thus full service brokers will be forced to reduce their prices to 
compete, leading to a convergence in the pricing structure of retail brokers. Exactly the 
opposite seems to be true as of late 1999: there are wide differences in advertised 
brokerage cornmissions on the Internet, and in general commissions at online brokers are 
significantly lower than commissions at traditional, full service brokers. 
The purpose of this paper is to test whether pricing in the retail brokerage market 
is consistent with the "law of one price" characterizing a Bertrand-type of 
equilibrium in which all firms oJfer a commodity product at the same price. 
In the next section we suggest three possible explanations for why the one price 
law does not appear to hold in this market, and test one of them in a carefully designed 
experiment involving the simultaneous purchase and sale of stocks from different 
brokers. Specifically we test the hypothesis that the commissions advertised on the 
Internet differ widely because they do not represent the total cost of trading stock. In 
particular, the total cost of a trade includes the commission and the quality of execution 
of a trade (Friend, Irwin and Blume, 1973). One broker may be able to obtain a better 
price than another through the mechanism of a price improvement from posted bidlask 
prices. This paper asks if the total cost of trading, consisting of commission and any 
savings based on the quality of execution, is consistent with an equilibrium characterized 
by the law of one price. 
BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
The retail brokerage industry in the U.S. has been traditionally characterized by 
two types of brokers: full service brokers like Merrill Lynch and Dean Witter, and 
discount brokers like Fidelity and Charles Schwab. Until the mid 1990s full service 
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brokers typically charged commissions of $150 or higher even for small trades of 100 
shares, while the discount brokers often charged one half that amount or less. 
The late 1990s saw the increasing popularity of online brokers like E*Trade, 
Datek and Accutrade, which use the Internet as the primary delivery channel for their 
services. These online brokers have substantially changed the competitive landscape; one 
of their most noticeable impacts has been the availability of deeply discounted 
commissions, as low as $7 per trade, which contrasts with the $100 and higher typical 
commission charged by full service brokers. 
It can be argued that these brokers, whether full service or online, offer a 
commodity product: the shares purchased through any of them are for all practical 
purposes identical, as a share of IBM purchased through Merrill Lynch is identical to a 
share of IBM purchased through Datek. Economic theory predicts that in "ideal" 
commodity markets with several competing firms, competition will bring prices close to 
marginal costs (including a "fair" return on investment) (Bertrand, 1883). In the resulting 
"Bertrand equilibrium all firms offer the commodity product at the same price (the "law 
of one price"). If a firm increases its price above this equilibrium price it would lose all 
of its customers as they flee to lower priced firms. If a firm were able to lower its price 
below the equilibrium price while still making a profit, perhaps because of superior 
technology compared to the other firms, it would capture the whole market, causing the 
exit of firms with a higher cost structure. 
The variance of commission charges in the brokerage industry from under $8 to 
over $100 for the same 100-share trade (as of September 1999) clearly violates the law of 
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one price. In this paper we attempt to shed some light on this paradox. There are three 
broad classes of theoretical explanations for why the one-price law may not hold: 
I. The current state of the retail brokerage market is not an equilibrium. 
2. The law of one price does hold when differences in the quality of execution are 
taken into account. 
3. The brokerage market is not an "idealy' commodity market as assumed in the 
economic model of Bertrand competition. 
The first explanation asserts that the departure from the law of one price is a transient 
phenomenon; as customers move from high-priced brokers to low-priced brokers, the 
high priced brokers will either have to lower their prices or will have to exit the market. 
Market share data, which show a continuously increasing market share for online brokers, 
lend some support to this explanation. 
The second possibility is that brokerage commissions are not the appropriate "prices" 
to study, as they do not represent the total cost to the consumer. Rational consumers care 
about the total cost of acquiring equities; if the quality of execution varies across brokers, 
then the brokers offering the best executions are able to charge higher commissions 
without losing customers to brokers charging lower commissions. The full service broker 
may be able to obtain better executions due to in-house crossing of trades, not selling 
order flow, access to institutional trading, better traders or better computer systems. 
The third explanation asserts that the retail brokerage services market departs from 
the "ideal" Walrasian market postulated by economic theory. Reasons for this departure 
from the ideal include: 
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a. Products offered by different brokers, especially when comparing full service and 
online brokers, are not identical commodities, thus justifying a price differential 
(Hotelling, 1929). For example, customers may value the ability to transact with a 
human broker. In that case, full service brokers that offer their customers access to a 
human broker are able to capture some or all the additional utility they provide 
customers through higher commissions. 
b. Customers in the retail brokerage market are not homogeneous. Their differences 
result in "separating" equilibria characterized by different prices (Diamond, 1987). 
For example, customers may differ in their value for the long history and prestige of 
the brand name of full service brokers, or the value they place on the services 
provided by full service brokers. In this case customers with high value for these 
services flock to the full service brokers, while customers with low (or negative) 
value for these services use online brokers. The commissions charged by the two 
types of brokers differ, reflecting the cost of the services offered by full service 
brokers. Notice that this example is different than the previous case, because the 
previous explanation assumes that all customers have the same preferences. 
One special type of heterogeneity may be customers' ability to use an online 
broker, in terms of their computer literacy and the availability of reliable access to the 
Internet at the time they desire to place a trade. Another possibility is that price 
sensitive customers moved first to the lower priced online brokers, leaving only price 
insensitive customers behind. 
c. Search costs (and resulting lack of information) may prevent customers from 
finding low cost sellers despite the large advertising budgets of online brokers (Pratt, 
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Wise and Zeckhauser, 1979; Stigler, 1961). The brokerage case is unlike the case for 
books, see Brynjolfsson and Smith, (1999). 
d. Switching costs may prevent customers from changing their brokers. Customers 
often leave their securities with a broker and become accustomed to the reporting and 
information they receive. Moving one's securities or managing multiple brokerage 
accounts may act as a deterrent to switching. 
In summary, commissions may be different even though the quality of execution may 
not differ because brokers who charge more expensive commission provide a different 
total service. It also may be that consumers (or at least the ones using 
traditionallexpensive brokers) have high search costs, or face a high switching cost. 
Finally, customers of high commission brokers may be less price sensitive than other 
investors. 
The experiment reported in this paper was designed to test the second explanation 
above. Specifically we ask whether the variance in commissions between brokers in 
general, and between full service and online brokers in particular, is due to differences in 
the quality of execution obtained by different types of brokers. Specifically, we test the 
hypothesis that 
<total cost to consumer> = <commission> + <execution price> 
obeys the law of one price across different brokers. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
To test the hypothesis above, we need data on commissions and on the quality of 
execution. Internet brokers publish their brokerage cornmissions since they view them as 
a source of competitive advantage. Full service brokers are less open in publishing 
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commission schedules, though one can obtain them through a broker from one of these 
firms. When one executes a trade, the confirmation from the broker shows the applicable 
commission. 
While past papers have used simulations to estimate the impact of different 
trading strategies (Battalio, et al., 1999), we felt that a proper test of the law of one price 
required actual stock trades in a controlled experimental setting. Comparing execution 
prices implies that one must execute identical trades at different brokers nearly 
simultaneously so that each broker faces the same market conditions and bidlask spread 
executing the trade. Our strategy was to compare three types of brokers, full service 
brokers using a human intermediary, and two different types of online brokers. The 
experiment includes both NYSE and NASDAQ listed stocks. 
The Salomon Brothers Center at the Stern School at NYU agreed to provide 
financing and working capital, $60,000 in total, for a controlled experiment. We opened 
six brokerage accounts for three different kinds of brokers: 1) two "voice brokers " who 
take orders the traditional way with the investor calling and speaking to a human broker, 
2) two "expensive" online brokers, and 3) two "inexpensive" online brokers. In the 
paper, the voice brokers are designated as A and B, the expensive on-line brokers as J and 
K, and the inexpensive online brokers as Y and Z. Commissions for trading 100 shares 
were in the $50 range for the voice brokers, the $15 range for the expensive electronic 
brokers, and under $10 for the inexpensive electronic brokers. 
The experimental design involved 64 trials, each placing three simultaneous buy 
or sell orders for 100 shares of the same stock, using a voice broker, a expensive online 
broker and an inexpensive online broker . In other words, each trial involved one of 
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brokers A and B, one of brokers J and K and one of brokers Y and Z. Out of the total 64 
trials in the experiment, 32 were buy orders and 32 were sell orders for 32 different 
stocks. (Note that we did not have the ability to choose the stocks for sale; we had to sell 
the stocks that we had previously purchased.) The blocked design can be found in the 
appendix. The layout was completely balanced with respect to brokers and exchanges. 
For any dependent variable, such as price improvement, there are 192 values which 
consist of 16 buys and 16 sells for each of 6 brokers ((16+16) x 6 = 192). An analysis of 
variance model corresponding to the design has fixed effects for the six brokers, for the 
two listing exchanges and for buy versus sell. The model has random effects for the 32 
individual stocks and for statistical noise, 
We conducted the experiment over an eleven-day period during July and August, 
1999. The experimenters worked in a room with a telephone and two computers with 
high-speed connections to the Internet. In the morning between 10:OO and 10:30, we 
selected stocks to purchase as specified in the experimental design. The selection came 
from the stocks in Standard and Poors Platinum and Fair Value Portfolios as listed in 
their newsletter, Investor's Monthly; the criteria for choosing a stock involved price, 
volume and spread. We chose securities priced under $50 so as not to exhaust our 
working capital at any one broker on a given day, and we selected stocks that showed 
active trading volume. We chose stocks with a spread of at least 1/8th, so that there was 
some potential for price improvement. All transactions were for a lot of 100 shares, 
which is one of the lot sizes retail customers frequently trade. Each trial comparing three 
brokers involved a different stock to remove any variation caused by the security being 
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purchased, and all trades were "at market." There were a total of 64 trials involving three 
brokers per trial for a total of 192 trades. 
Each trial involved one voice broker, one expensive online broker and one 
inexpensive online broker. An experimenter at each computer completed the purchase 
screen for an online broker, pausing just before clicking on the button to submit the trade. 
The experimenter talktng to the voice broker signaled when the broker indicated he had 
submitted the order, at which point the experimenters at each computer clicked to submit 
their trades. A11 three transactions were thus identical ("buy 100 shares of PRQ 
Corporation at the market") and were as close as humanly and electronically possible to 
being simultaneous (see below). 
Beginning at approximately 3:30 PM in the afternoon, we simultaneously sold 
the stocks purchased in the morning so that we held no position longer than six hours. 
We recorded data identifying each broker, the bidask spread from the online brokers' 
real-time quotes and the voice broker's bidask spread just before the transaction. We 
also recorded the execution price and the commissions, which we verified when we 
received the printed trade confirmations. 
The Bloomberg Terminal provides a detailed trace of transactions, and we copied 
this log for each of our trading sessions. Using this trace, it was possible to identify all 
three trades in 60 out of our 64 trials and to verify that they had been executed as closely 
together as possible. Table 1 shows the distribution of the time required for order 
execution for the 64 trials, each involving three brokers. Of the trades, almost 66% 
occurred within one minute of submission, and 87% within two minutes. There were no 
changes in the bidask quotes from the time we entered our trades until they executed, 
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except for two suspicious trades noted later in the paper. It appears that the experiment 
was successful in achieving nearly simultaneous trade execution for the three brokers in 
each trial. 
I Delay (minutes) I Count I Percentage 
Table 1 
4 < x < = 5  
Unable to identify 
RESULTS 
Price Improvement for Brokers 
A broker obtains a price improvement when the execution price of a trade is better 
than the bid price for a sale or the ask price for a buy. For example, consider a stock that 
is quoted as $30 bid, $30 1/4 asked. This spread means that the specialist or market 
maker will buy shares of the stock for $30 and will sell them for $30.25 each. Assume 
two brokers have "buy" orders at the market price, and the first broker buys the stock at 
$30 1/4. The second broker is able to get a price of $30 3/16ths, and thus offers the 
customer a better execution. This second broker has obtained a "price improvement" of 
1/16" or 0.0625 per share. On a 100 share order, the improvement is $6.25. In this 
example the second broker has obtained a better execution price for the customer than the 
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Distribution of Executions 
1 
4 
1.6% 
6.3% 
first broker. An improvement like this occurs, for example, when a floor broker offers to 
sell at a better (lower) price than the specialist's ask price in order to sell stock. 
Since published commissions differ across brokers, for the law of one price to 
hold, more expensive brokers must offer better execution than brokers with lower 
commissions. For the retail customer, price improvements are fundamental to better 
execution, and in this section we present the data on price improvements and compare 
them among brokers. 
Figure 1 shows price improvements during trading for each of the six brokers. 
The most frequent improvement was none, and the most inexpensive e-broker executed at 
the bid or ask price for 25 of 32 trades. Note that two trades for the same stock placed 
through electronic brokers J and Y actually resulted in a negative improvement! In this 
instance, the trade executed outside of the quoted bid/ask spread as the NASDAQ market 
maker changed the spread as the order was received. This action was evident on the 
Bloomberg daily trace, and we sent letters asking for an explanation to each b r ~ k e r . ~  
Because these prices are what an individual trading would have received, we did not 
adjust the data. 
It appeared to us that the market maker saw the orders coming and lowered the bid price for our two 
trades, raising it immediately afterwards. One broker did not respond to our letter and the other advised us 
to use limit orders rather than market orders. 
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Broker J Broker K Broker Y Broker Z 1 
BrokerA 
BrokerB 
Table shows the results of 16 direct comparisons. 
For figures separated by slashes: 
the first figure is the number of times the broker named in the row had better price 
improvement 
the second figure is the number of times the two brokers had equal price 
improvement 
the third figure is the number of times the broker named in the column had better 
price improvement 
Broker J 
Broker K 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank statistic is given as Wand is a test of the null hypothesis that 
the median difference between the brokers in a pair is 0. 
111312 W=2.0 
111411 Wz2.0 
Price Improvement Broker Comparisons 
Table 2 
311211 Wz8.0 
011511 W=O.O 
The experimental design matches one voice broker with two online brokers (one 
111411 1 . 5  
511110 W=15* 
511110 W=15* 
111311 Wz2.0 
expensive and one inexpensive) for 16 trials, 8 buys and 8 sells. While each broker is 
involved in 32 trials in total, we only have 16 comparisons among specific brokers, all 
211113 Wz7.5 
311310 Wz6.0 
with the same stocks, market conditions, bidlask spreads, day and time of the week. Table 
311211 W=8.0 
411210 W=lO* 
2 shows statistical comparisons based on these head-to-head pairwise comparisons of the 
brokers. This table has only three painvise differences that are statistically significant, 
and they are significant only at the 10% level: B over K, B over 2, and J over 2. 
It is also possible to compare price improvement across the 32 transactions for 
each broker; see Figure 2. As indicated in this figure, voice brokers on average provided 
the most improvement, and the inexpensive e-brokers provided the least improvement. 
In the context of the full experiment, the broker differences produced an I; value of 2.24, 
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on (5, 123) degrees of freedom. The associatedp value is 0.054. This analysis used 
fixed effects for the brokers and random effects for the triplets. The only interesting 
differences, using Tukey's painvise method, are B over K (p = 0.11) and B over Y 
(p = 0.07). Our conclusion is that there is little or no difference among the brokers on 
price improvements. 
Price Improvement Averages 
Cents per Share 
A B J K Y Z 
Broker 
Average Price Improvement by 
Broker Across all 32 Trials 
Figure 2 
What is the power of the design? How likely are we to find a difference if one 
exists? We designed the experiment with a sample size that was reasonable for finding 
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moderate-to-large differences. With respect to price improvements, the statistical power 
was substantially eroded by the prevalence of tied values, meaning instances in which 
two brokers in a comparison had identical prices (see Table 2). With regard to total costs 
presented later in the paper, the experiment has more than adequate power, and indeed 
brokers have statistically significant and material differences in total trading costs. 
Price Improvement by Market 
It is interesting to ask if there is a difference in price improvement among 
markets. Our trades were executed on at least six different markets, which we have 
broken into four groups: the NYSE, the Third Market, Regional Exchanges ("Other") and 
the NASDAQ. Figure 3 shows the mean improvement for the non-NASDAQ market. 
(We did not include the NASDAQ in the table because there is only one choice of where 
to trade NASDAQ stocks, while shares listed on the NYSE may be traded in a number of 
markets. We received few price improvements on buy orders of NASDAQ stocks and no 
improvements on sell orders.) 
The New York Stock Exchange, itself, provided the largest mean price 
improvement while the Third Market had the least. Table 3 shows that the differences 
among markets are statistically significant. In a more intricate general linear model 
treatment of the entire experiment, the market effect is also significant. This test included 
the data from NASDAQ trades. The F statistic for the exchange effect is 4.32, on 
(3, 182) df, andp = 0.006. These results suggest that the market where a trade is executed 
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Price Improvement Averages 
Cents per Share 
0.07 
NYSE Other Third Market 
Exchange 
Price Improvement by Market 
Figure 3 
F = 6.83; (2,93) df; p = 0.002 
This F statistic is based on the assumption that the 31 + 24 + 41 = 96 trades are 
statistically independent. 
Standard 
Deviation of 
Price Improvement 
0.0522 
0.0353 
0.037 1 
Price Improvement by Market 
Table 3 
Mean 
Price Improvement 
0.0645 
0.0417 
0.0274 
Market 
M S E  
Other 
Third Market 
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Number of Trades 
3 1 
24 
41 
does make a difference in the likelihood of getting a price improvement. 
Total Trading Cost 
Our test of the law of one price requires the computation of a total trading cost 
that includes both commissions and some measure of execution quality. Price 
improvement is the mechanism for measuring the quality of execution, but exactly how to 
arrive at a total trading cost given trades with and without price improvements is not 
immediately obvious. Following Battalio et al. (1999) and Lee (1993), we computed the 
total cost of a trade as the commission plus the liquidity premium. This premium is 
defined as the difference between the midprice of the bidask spread and the execution 
price. For a buy, the premium is the execution price - the midprice and for a sell, it is the 
midprice - the execution price. A price improvement moves the execution price closer to 
the midprice, and thus results in a lower liquidity premium and lower total trade cost. 
Table 4 presents the pair-wise comparisons of costs by broker for the 16 paired 
 trade^.^ The mean differences in the table result from subtracting the total cost of the 
broker in the column from the total cost of the broker in the row for the 16 trials in which 
the pair participated together. It is clear from the Table that there are statistically 
significant differences among the brokers on total trade cost. The magnitude of the 
Broker B provided a 10% rebate on commissions for July and August. There was no explanation of the 
basis for this rebate, or whether one could count on receiving it over time. As a result, we have used the 
actual commissions Broker B charged at the time of trade and have not subtracted the later rebate. 
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differences shows that the total costs of a trade for 100 shares with expensive online 
brokers is less than the total costs of voice brokers, except for broker B versus broker J. 
Total trading costs for inexpensive online brokers are significantly less than total trading 
costs either for the two voice brokers or the two expensive online brokers. All 
differences except broker B versus J are highly significant statistically. 
Figure 4 is a graph of the mean trading cost for each of the 32 trades by broker. 
The differences are highly statistically significant using an analysis of variance (F = 
67.57, p< 0.01;01, Chi-Square of 133.97, p< 0 .01), though such tests are not completely 
appropriate given the limitations of the research design.4 
Strictly speaking one should only compare costs within the 16 trials for each broker that involve the same 
stock, bid/ask spreads, etc. 
Z 
-52.08 [4.09] 
(-50.88)""" 
-24.55 13.761 
(-26.09)""" 
-21.00 13.001 
(-28.07)""" 
-10.84 13.501 
(-12.40)""" 
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* p<=. 10, **p<= .05, ***PC= 1 
Mean differences for 16 matched trades, [standard deviation], (t statistic) 
Positive differences favor the broker in the row 
Negative differences favor the broker in the column 
Comparison of Mean Total Trading Costs 
Table 4 
Y 
-5 1.86 15.801 
(-35.74)""" 
-21.20 112.651 
(-6.71)""" 
-20.39 15.351 
(-15.24)""" 
-9.84 12.651 
(-14.85)""" 
A 
B 
J 
I( 
J 
-30.69 12.771 
(-44.39)""" 
-0.82 112.71 
(-0.26) 
K 
-42.80 12.781 
(61.66)""" 
-13.32 13.571 
(-14.91)""" 
Total Cost Averages 
Dollars per 1 00 Shares 
Total Cost is defined as Broker 
Commission + 100 X (Liquidity Premium per share) 
Mean Trading Cost by Broker 
Figure 4 
The results are very clear: for 100 share lots, commission costs dominate the 
quality of execution because there are so few price improvements and their magnitude is 
so small. For 100 share lots, the one price law is not supported; the argument that total 
trading costs are equal among brokers because the quality of execution balances 
commissions is not valid. 
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IMPLICATIONS 
The results of this study show, that for 100 share lots, there is little difference in 
price improvement among brokers. At this volume, the commission is the dominant cost 
of the trade. There are significant differences in total cost among brokers, so the broker 
one selects matters. In general, at 100 shares, voice brokers have a higher total cost than 
expensive electronic brokers, who in turn have a higher total cost than inexpensive 
electronic brokers. 
Our selection of stocks for buy orders excluded securities with spreads less than 
1/8", and thus provided an opportunity for price improvement. Where price 
improvement is unlikely, the results suggest that the investor will experience lower total 
trading costs from electronic brokers, at least for 100 share blocks. 
Other Lot Sizes 
Limited resources prevented us from varying the block size for trades. To what 
extent do our results generalize to larger blocks of stock? Figure 5 shows the 
commission structure for the brokers in our study by lot size. The differences in 
comissions raise an interesting question: what kind of price improvement would be 
necessary for a broker charging a higher commission to have a total trade cost less than 
the total cost for a broker with lower commissions? To be precise, we are interested in a 
differential price improvement as the lower commission broker might also provide a price 
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Published Commissions 
100 500 1000 2500 
Number of Shares 
One of the brokers had separate commission structures for NYSE-listed and 
Nasdaq-listed stocks. As the experiment selected exactly half its stocks from each, we 
used the average commissions in making the calculations above. 
Commissions by Trade Size 
Figure 5 
improvement on an order. 
Figure 6 shows the price improvement needed by each of the five brokers to offset 
their higher commissions when compared with Broker Z, the lowest commission 
electronic broker in our sample (assuming Broker Z obtains no price improvement). We 
have chosen to extrapolate only to a block of 2500 shares as retail customers generally 
trade at this volume or lower, and it is not clear whether or not one could negotiate better 
commissions at higher volumes when dealing with voice brokers. The highest average 
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Price Improvement Needed to offset Lowest 
Commission Broker 
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Figure 6 
price improvement in our study was $0.041 per share for Voice Broker B. When we 
compare average improvements for 100 shares, only the electronic Brokers are within the 
range of the lowest cost electronic Broker Z in Figure 6 above. The figures indicate that, 
for retail trades of 100 to 1,000 shares, it will be difficult for the more costly brokers (A 
and B) to offset their higher commissions through price improvements. 
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Cost per share (in cents), based on commissions only: 
Cost per share (in cents), commissions less average price improvement: 
Broker 
A 
B 
J 
K 
Y 
Z 
One of the brokers had separate commission structures for NYSE-listed and 
Nasdaq-listed stocks. As the experiment selected exactly half its stocks from each, we 
used the average commissions in making the calculations above. 
Transaction size (shares) 
Broker 
A 
B 
J 
K 
Y 
Z 
The Impact of Price Improvements 
Table 5 
100 
60.25 
33.50 
29.95 
17.45 
8.00 
7.00 
Because the high commission brokers provided the most price improvement in 
Transaction size (shares) 
our sample, commission differences alone overstate the total savings of using a low-cost 
500 
12.05 
13.50 
5.99 
3.49 
1.60 
1.40 
on-line broker as shown in Table 5. The top half of the table contains each broker's 
100 
56.93 
29.398 
27.61 
14.91 1 
6.44 
5.047 
commissions for four different trade sizes. The bottom half of the table subtracts the 
1,000 
8.025 
11.00 
2.995 
1.745 
0.80 
0.70 
1,000 
4.705 
6.898 
0.655 
-0.794 
-0.76 
-1.253 
500 
8.73 
9.398 
3.65 
0.95 1 
0.04 
-0.553 
average improvement we experienced for each broker from the commission. For 
2,500 
7.41 
9.50 
3.00 
0.698 
0.32 
0.28 
2,500 
4.09 
5.398 
0.66 
-1.841 
-1.24 
-1.673 
example, for a trade of 1000 shares, Broker A's 8.025 cents per share cost based on 
commission alone becomes 4.705 cents per share after adjusting for price improvements. 
See Table 6 for an illustration of the actual advantage of using Broker Y rather than B. 
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(We used the published commission schedules, and thus the commissions are correct for 
the four order sizes listed above. Price improvements, however, are based on transactions 
of 100 shares; we are projecting similar price improvements on transactions of sizes 500, 
1,000, and 2,500 shares.) 
Transaction size (shares) 
Savings from Using Broker Y 100 500 1,000 2,500 
rather than Broker B (cents per 
share) 
Savings from commission Costs 25.50 11.90 10.20 9.18 
Only 
Savings Based on Total Cost 22.96 9.36 7.66 6.64 
As an illustration, the savings in cents per share of using Broker Y for a 1,000 share trade 
rather than Broker B falls from 10.2 cents per share based on commission cost alone to 
7.7 cents per share when price improvement is taken into account. 
Table 6: Cost Comparison Illustration 
While price improvements moderate the effects of high commissions, the 
projected data still strongly favors online brokers. Based on our data, it is unlikely that 
voice brokers will be able to make up their higher commission through price 
improvements, at least up to a trades under 2,500 shares. 
'While price improvements tend to reduce the diferences among voice, expensive 
and inexpensive on-line brokers, price improvements do not appear sufficient to change 
the rankings of the brokers on total cost up to a volume of 2,500 shares. The data 
suggest that voice brokers will be the most expensive in terms of total trading cost 
followed by expensive online brokers followed by inexpensive online brokers. 
Why the Law of One Price May Not Hold 
Originally we suggested three possible explanations for why the variance in 
commissions in the brokerage model might violate the law of one price, The first of 
these is that brokerage markets are not in equilibrium and the third is that the brokerage 
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market is not an "ideal" commodity market as assumed in Bertrand competition. We 
believe that aspects of both explanations may account for the results of our experiment. 
The equilibrium argument suggests that as customers move to low-priced brokers, 
higher-priced brokers will have to adjust their prices, However, the results of this 
research show that it is difficult for the investor to discover the total cost of trading. 
Electronic markets facilitate price discovery for only one part of the cost, the brokerage 
commission, and it is relatively easy to compare these commissions. However, it is 
extremely difficult to discover the "price" of the liquidity premium for electronic or voice 
brokers. An individual investor would have to conduct the kind of experiment reported 
here, which is not practical for most individuals. Price discovery in the brokerage 
industry is incomplete, and electronic trading has not increased its transparency 
sufficiently to help the customers make informed decisions that result in market 
equilibrium. 
Another possibility is that the retail brokerage market is not a commodity market, 
and that different brokers offer differentiated products. Full service brokers may offer a 
different type of product than online brokers, for instance by encouraging interaction over 
the telephone with a live broker and "hand holding" the customer through the order 
placing process. Alternatively, it is possible that consumers are heterogeneous, with full 
service brokers serving retail investors who are relatively insensitive to trading costs. 
Finally, the high search costs involved in finding out the total cost of trading with any 
particular broker, combined with the substantial switching costs involved in moving an 
account to a new broker, may prevent some consumers from switching to the lower 
priced brokers 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-99-014 
Choosing a Broker 
Our results suggest that, for lot sizes of 100 shares, there are differences among 
voice brokers, expensive e-brokers and inexpensive e-brokers. Total trading costs occur 
in that order. At this volume, commissions dominate the liquidity premium. In fact, if 
one examines Figure 1, we received price improvements a relatively small number of 
times during the experiment. Trading at this volume, or trading securities with narrow 
bidlask spreads so that an improvement is unlikely, favors electronic brokers. 
As the size of a trade increases, the choice is less clear. If one is trading once or a 
small number of times, then the likelihood of a price improvement is small, and the 
investor can make a decision based on commission costs. If trading large blocks on a 
frequent basis, then the investor should be guided by expected value. Extrapolating the 
results of this study, the expected value of price improvements for full service brokers 
does not offset their commissions at higher trade sizes, and the investor appears to be 
better off with online brokers. It appears that the broker does matter, and the markets 
fail to provide sufficient information for retail investors to evaluate the total cost of 
trading. 
SUMMARY 
Our research involved a controlled experiment comparing two voice brokers, two 
expensive online brokers, and two inexpensive online brokers in 64 trials with 
simultaneous trades of 100 shares of different stocks. The results suggest that: 
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1. The law of one price of the Bertrand model of price competition does not hold 
in the retail brokerage industry today as price improvements by more expensive 
brokers do not offset higher commissions. Total trading costs differ across 
brokers, and electronic trading, by enabling extremely low commissions, has 
probably widened cost differences among brokers. 
2. Price improvements trading NYSE-listed stocks differ by market, with the most 
improvement on the NYSE and the least in Third Market. 
3. For 100 share orders, total costs were highest for voice brokers and lowest for 
inexpensive online brokers. 
4. Our results suggest that most retail investors will experience the lowest total 
trading costs with online brokers when trading small lots. The choice of a broker 
is more difficult for the investor who trades large volumes and therefore may have 
a greater chance of price improvement. 
5. Further research is needed to see if the quality of execution offsets higher 
commission costs for orders larger than 100 shares, as it is possible the size of a 
customer's order influences price improvements. 
Electronic commerce is responsible for changing many markets, and Internet 
brokerage firms have been very successful in capturing retail market share. The Internet 
provides electronic brokerage firms with a lower cost structure than full service brokers, 
and our sample indicates that consumers are benefiting through lower trading costs. 
Although higher-commission brokerage firms in our sample provided a greater level of 
price improvement, they nevertheless imposed the highest total trading costs on their 
retail customers. Not surprisingly, electronic brokerages are forcing full service firms like 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
W o r h g  Paper IS-99-014 
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and Merrill Lynch to offer on-line trading at much lower 
costs than their traditional commissions (Business Week, 11/15/99). 
Electronic commerce has increased the visibility of commissions, but it has yet to 
make the quality of execution obvious to the investor. This research demonstrates that 
electronic commerce in the brokerage market has not yet resulted in a Bertrand-type 
equilibrium with convergence to one price for total trading costs -retail consumers are 
still advised to shop for the lowest all-in trading costs consistent with their requirements 
for additional investment services. As full service brokers offer more low-price, on-line 
trading options, and as awareness grows of differential price improvements from brokers, 
we predict a greater degree of convergence in total trading costs. 
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Appendix: Experimental Design 
Note that the days were not executed in order due to delays in opening accounts at several brokers. W e  conducted the trials indicated 
for each day. 
DAY 1 
BROKER A BROKER J B r o k e r  Z NYSE 
B r o k e r  B B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Y NASDAQ 
BROKER A B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Z NASDAQ 
DAY 2 
B r o k e r  B BROKER J B r o k e r  Y NYSE 
BROKER A BROKER J B r o k e r  Y NYSE 
B r o k e r  B B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Z NASDAQ 
Day 3 
BROKER A B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Y NASDAQ 
B r o k e r  B BROKER J B r o k e r  Z NYSE 
BROKER A B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Y NYSE 
Day 4 
B r o k e r  B BROKER J B r o k e r  Z NYSE 
BROKER A BROKER J B r o k e r  Y NASDAQ 
B r o k e r  B BROKER J B r o k e r  Y NASDAQ 
Day 5 
BROKER A B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Z NASDAQ 
B r o k e r  B B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Z NYSE 
BROKER A BROKER J B r o k e r  Z NYSE 
Day 6 
B r o k e r  B B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Y NYSE 
BROKER A B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Z NYSE 
B r o k e r  B B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Y NYSE 
Day 7 
BROKER A BROKER J B r o k e r  Z NASDAQ 
B r o k e r  B BROKER J B r o k e r  Y NASDAQ 
BROKER A BROKER J B r o k e r  Y NASDAQ 
Day 8 
B r o k e r  B BROKER J B r o k e r  Z NASDAQ 
BROKER A B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Y NYSE 
B r o k e r  B B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Z NASDAQ 
Day 9 
BROKER A BROKER J B r o k e r  Z NASDAQ 
B r o k e r  B BROKER J B r o k e r  Z NASDAQ 
BROKER A B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Y NASDAQ 
Day 10 
B r o k e r  B B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Y NASDAQ 
BROKER A BROKER J B r o k e r  Y NY SE 
B r o k e r  B BROKER J B r o k e r  Y NYSE 
Day 11 
BROKER A B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Z NYSE 
B r o k e r  B B r o k e r  K B r o k e r  Z NYSE 
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